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ABSTRACT
The theory of risk exchange is applied on the allocation of financial risk in
capital markets. It is shown how the shape of individual payoff functions
depends on risk tolerance and cautiousness. For the special case where the
Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions of all individual investors belong to
the HARA class and have non decreasing risk tolerance it is proved that
generalized versions of " portfolio insurance ", " tactical asset allocation " and
"collars" are the only strategies occurring in price equilibrium.
KEYWORDS
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1. INTRODUCTION
For quite a long time the MARKOWITZ (1952) approach and the Capital Asset
Pricing Model (SHARPE, 1964; LINTNER, 1965) played a predominant role in
financial economics. In such a framework only linear risk allocations can
occur. However, in 1973 BLACK and SCHOLES published their famous option
pricing formula, which allows in particular for a replication of options by
means of dynamic strategies. Options and their dynamic replication became
increasingly popular. Nowadays, non linear investment strategies, such as
portfolio insurance, tactical asset allocation and collars are widely used.
In actuarial science non linear risk allocations are a central issue in the
reinsurance context. Already in 1960 Borch's theorem on Pareto efficient risk
sharing was published. Later on, BUHLMANN (1984) proved the existence of a
price density leading to a Pareto efficient risk allocation which is typically non
linear. In BOHLMANN (1980) and LIENHARD (1986) price densities were
explicitly calculated for some special cases.
LELAND (1980) was the first who applied the actuarial results on non linear
risk sharing in financial economics. By means of Borch's theorem he analysed
the occurrence of portfolio insurance in the context of capital market equilib-
rium. MOLLER (1990, 1991) applied Buhlmann's equilibrium model on the
capital market and obtained some first results about the qualitative shape of
risk allocations.
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In this article total financial risk has to be allocated to n investors. Following
the tradition of RUBINSTEIN (1976), BRENNAN (1979) and LELAND (1980) all
investment decisions have to be made at one point of time. First, the main
results of the theory of risk exchange are shortly summarized. Thereafter,
different types of investment strategies such as portfolio insurance, tactical
asset allocation and collars are explained in the context of risk exchange. It is
shown how the type of investment strategy chosen by an individual investor
depends on the risk tolerances of all investors and their sensitivity to wealth
changes. Finally price equilibria are analysed in the special case where the
Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions of all investors belong to the HARA
class. Generalized versions of portfolio insurance, tactical asset allocation and
collars are the only investment strategies which can occur.
2. THEORY OF RISK EXCHANGE
2.1. The model
As in RUBINSTEIN (1976), BRENNAN (1979) and LELAND (1980) trade takes
only place at one point of time.
There are n investors / = 1,.. . , n with the following characteristics:
1) All investors have the same planning horizon and the same expectations. In
particular, their expectations with respect to total financial wealth (aggre-
gate market value of all financial assets in an economy) at the end of the
planning period are given by a random variable W.
2) Moreover, the value of investor Cs (i = 1, .. . ,«) initial endowment at the
end of the planning period can be represented by random variables Xt,
s.t.
n
Xt > 0, Y, *t = W, a .e . ' .
3) Each investor i = 1,. . . ,« evaluates his wealth at the end of the planning
period by a Neumann-Morgenstern utility function
! / , : / ? ->/? , i = \, ..., n.
Hence, for the investors i = 1,. . . ,« with the initial risk allocation
(Xu...,Xn)
1
 If initial endowments consist only of the market portfolio and a riskless asset, then
X, = at + st- W, a.e. i ' = l , . . . , « , with 2_, ai ~ 0, ^ s,— 1
holds.
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a reallocation of total financial risk
n
( Z 1 ; . . . , Z n ) with Y 2i=W
has to be found.
1=1
Initial allocation of total financial wealth
Reallocation of total financial wealth
FIGURE 1.
Obviously, this framework allows for the application of standard results in
risk theory (e.g. BORCH (1960), BOHLMANN (1980, 1984)).
2.2. Theory of risk exchange: standard results
The following assumptions will be useful:
A.I. a) The random variable W is given by the probability space (R, B, P),
where B denotes the Borel-cr-algebra. There exist constants m, M with
0 < m < M < oo, such that
P[m< W<M]= 1.
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b) There exist measurable functions ht, i= 1, ..., n such that
X^htiW), a.e.2.
c) E[X,] > 0.
A.2. The Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions «,; R-> R, i= 1, . . . ,« are
twice differentiable and satisfy
w/(x)>0, M , " ( X ) < 0 VJC.
A.3. The Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions w,; R-*R, i = \,...,n are
three times continuously differentiable.
Moreover, the following definitions are needed:
Definition 1: An «-tuple of random variables (Z,, ..., Z J is called a feasible
allocation if it satisfies
n
X Z, = W, a.e.
Definition 2: A measurable function
(f>: [m,M] -> [0, oo[
is called a price density if it satisfies
E[<f>(W)]=\.
Remark: Under a price density <f> the value of a random variable Z, =ft(W) is
given by
(1) ^[./X^tfHWO] = f f,(w)<f>(w)dP(w).
Definition 3: The tuple {<j>, (Z\*, ..., Z*)} consisting of a price density <j> and
a feasible allocation (Zf, ..., Z*) is called a price equilibrium if for all
/ = I, ..., n Z,* is the solution of
max E[Ui(Z,)]
under
2
 Assumption A.l.b is made for expository convenience. As in BOHLMANN (1984) one could
define Xx,...,Xn as random variables on a common probability space (Q, A, IT). Using the
subsequent analysis one could show afterwards that W = Z" = , Xt is a sufficient statistic for the
problem under consideration.
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Definition 4: The feasible allocation (Z,*, . . . , Z*) is called Pareto efficient if
there exists no feasible allocation (Z, , . . . , Zn) satisfying
E[ui(Zl)]>E[ui(Zm i = l , . . . , «
with strict inequality for at least one /e{l , . . . , « } .
The standard results for this model can be summarized as follows (BUHL-
MANN (1980, 1984)):
Theorem 1:
1) Under A.I., A.2., A.3.3 there exists a price equilibrium {4>,(Zf, ...,Z*)}.
2) Under A. 1., A.2. each price equilibrium {(/>, (Zf*, . . . , Z*)} has the following
properties:
a) The risk allocation (Z,*, . . . , Z*) is Pareto efficient.
b) There exist yx, ..., yn e (0, oo) such that
(2) ul{Z*) =
 yi(t>{W)\ a.e. i = l , . . . , « .
As an immediate consequence one obtains:
Corollary 1: Under A.I., A.2. for each price equilibrium {</>, ( Z * , . . . , Z*)}
there exist measurable functions ft such that
(3) Z,* =fi{W), a.e., i=l,...,n.
In the context of financial economics it is of particular interest to have some
information about the shape of the functions/!, . . . ,/„ and <t>. Some results on
this issue are derived in the next section.
3. ANALYSIS OF PRICE EQUILIBRIA
3.1. Portfolio insurance, tactical asset allocation and collars
The term " portfolio insurance " is widely used for investment strategies where
a reference portfolio is protected by a put option. Obviously such strategies
lead to convex payoff functions. Therefore, LELAND (1980) introduced the term
"general insurance policy" for convex payoff functions. In this article we use
the following terminology:
Definition 5: An investment strategy leading to a twice differentiable payoff
function
/ : [m, M] -> R
3
 Instead of A3 BOHLMANN (1984) assumes that the functions />,(*) : = - —L~^ satify a Lipschitz
condition. In E. Chevallier's forthcoming thesis assumptions A.I, A.2, A.3 will be relaxed.
4
 See also BRENNAN/SOLANKI (1981).
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a) "Portfolio insurance" if/"(u;) > 0 Vwe[m, M].
b) "Tactical asset allocation" if/"(if) < 0 we[m, M].
c) "Collar" if
f"(w) > 0 Vu>e[m, wQ) and
f'(w) < 0 Vwe(wo,M], where m < w0 < M.
Portfolio insurance Tactical asset allocation
Collar
FIGURE 2.
Remarks:
1) Of course strategies with a continuous payoff function f(w) can be
approximated by buying and selling put and call options with different
striking prices (see also LELAND (1980)).
2) The term " tactical asset allocation " is motivated by the widely used " buy
low, sell high" strategies. The term "collar" is used for the popular
investment policy where a reference portfolio is held, a put option is bought
and a call option is sold.
3.2. Risk tolerance, cautiousness and properties of price equilibria
The following definition will be useful for the discussion of price equilibria.
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Definition 6:
a) tj(x) •= - — is called the risk tolerance of investor /.
u"{x)
b) Rj(x)'= — T,(X) is called the cautiousness of investor i5.
dx
Some well known characteristics of price equilibria can be formulated as
follows:
Proposition 1: Under A.I., A.2. a price equilibrium {^ , (f\(W), . . . ,/„
where </> and/ l 5 ...,/„ are differentiable has the properties:
n
a) £ / / ' ( « > ) = 1 ,
1=1
d ) — = - y~n
Proof: e.g. BOHLMANN (1984, p. 16-17) or HUANG/LITZENBERGER (1986).
In order to decide whether a payoff function /]• corresponds to portfolio
insurance, tactical asset allocation or a collar strategy its second derivative
fi"(w) has to be known. The notion of a "representative investor" will
considerably simplify the analysis of/"(w;).
Definition 7: Given a price equilibrium {(j>, (f\{W), ...,fn{W))} a function vm
with
v'm (w) = <t> (w)
is called Neumann-Morgenstern utility function of the representative inves-
tor.
Remark: The representative investor is a fictious individual representing the
market. Under the conditions of Proposition 1 and differentiability assump-
tions the risk tolerance xm (w) and the cautiousness Rm {w) of the representative
5
 Hence, the cautiousness /?, is a measure for the sensitivity of the risk tolerance z,{x) with respect
to wealth changes.
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investor are given
(4) Tm(l
(5) Rm(
ERIC
by
CHEVALLIER
v'm(w) _
v"m(w)
d
dw Z
AND HEINZ
<l>(w)
(/>' [w)
£"=i RJ(J
H. MOLLER
J J J
fj(w)) Xj(fj(w))
zi (/("'))
Hence, the risk tolerance xm(w) is the sum of individual risk tolerances,
whereas the cautiousness Rm (w) is a weighted mean of individual cautiousness
terms.
Now the result on the second derivatives of the payoff functions /) and the
price density <j> can be formulated as follows:
Theorem 2: Under A.I., A.2., A.3. a price equilibrium {<j>, {f\(W), ...,fn[W))}
where <f> and / i , . . . , / „ , are twice differentiate has the properties:
a) (l_W l
DJ — { 1 + Km \W)j ,
</>' (w) Tm (if)
, d , Ifi'iw)
c) — In
dw \f/(w) xm(w)
i,j= 1, ..., n.
Comments:
1) In particular Proposition 1 and Theorem 2 contain the key result
(6) fi(w)fi()
xm(w)
(7) sign {/.-(w)} = sign {/?,-(/•(«;))- Rm(w)}, / = 1, . . . , « .
In other words, the slope of the payoff function / is given by the ratio of the
risk tolerances T , ( / (MJ) ) and xm(w), whereas the curvature of/) is related to the
difference of the cautiousness terms /?,(/)(uO) and Rm(w).
2) Theorem 2.a) leads to the following criteria:
a) An investor /e{l , . . . ,«} chooses portfolio insurance if and only if
(8) Ri{fi(w))>Rm(w) Vu;".
b) An investor ie{\, . . . ,«} chooses tactical asset allocation if and only if
(9) RAfM) < Rm(w) VN.
LELAND (1980) derived a similar result in a less formal context.
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c) If an investor JG{1, . . . ,«} chooses a collar strategy there exists
w0 e (m, M) such that
2) Ri(fj(w)) — Rm{w) is strictly decreasing in w0-
3) An easy calculation shows that under A.2., A.3. u\"(/(if)) > 0, i = 1, ..., n
implies Rm(w)> - 1 .
Therefore, one concludes from Theorem 2b):
(10) f{w) > 0 if «/"(/,(«;)) > 0, i = 1, ..., n.
Proof of Theorem 2 :
a) Differentiation of the formula in Proposition lb)
f. (w) =
leads to
0,)
 ffl.
or
(12) ^ ^ ^ = —
/ ' ( )
b) Differentiation of the formula in Proposition Id)
= ~Tm(w)
f(l»)
leads to
<l>'2{w)-H^)f{w) _ , .
(13) = -Rm(w)
<t>'\w)
or
f (w)
(14) 1 + /Jm(w)= - T m ( u 0 - ! - ^ .
f(w)
c) From Proposition lb) one obtains
(15)
\f/(w)
and
06) ±m\J-L
=]n(T/iMw)))-]n(rj(fj(w)))
dw \f/(w)J T,-(/,(u»)) Tm(W) T7(//l»)) Tm(»)
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4. ANALYSIS OF PRICE EQUILIBRIA FOR THE H A R A CLASS
In Section 3 general properties of price equilibria were derived. Now we look at
the special case where the risk tolerance functions T,(X) are linear. Assumption
A.2. and A.3. are replaced by the assumption:
A.4. The Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions are increasing, concave and
satisfy
a) T,-(JC) = di+RjX > 0, with Rt>0,i=l,...,n,
b) Not all Rj identical.
Remarks:
1) Assumption A.4. allows for all Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions
which belong to the HARA class and have a non negative cautiousness7.
2) In the case where all Rj are identical the risk allocation is linear and a
detailed analysis can be found in BUHLMANN (1980) and LIENHARD
(1986).
3) For Rj > 0 the Neumann-Morgenstern utility function «, is only defined
on the interval —— , oo . Therefore, assumption A.2. is not satisfied and
\ R I
existence of a price equilibrium is not guaranteed by Theorem 1. However,
it can be easily verified that Proposition 1 and Theorem 2 are still valid if
Assumption A.2. and A.3. are replaced by A.4.
By restricting the analysis to the HARA class one obtains:
Lemma 1: Under A.I., A.4. a price equilibrium {$, (f\(W), ...,fn(W))} where
<j> and / i , . . . , / „ are differentiable8 has the property:
Rm(w) is strictly increasing.
Proof: A.4 and (5) lead to
n
(17) Rm{w)Tm{w) = £
7 = 1
(18) R'm(w)i
7
 A negative cautiousness would lead to problems with satiation and an unrealistic investment
behaviour (see ARROW (1965)).
8
 If (j>, fi, . . . , / „ are differentiable, then due to Proposition lb), Id) and A.4. they are also twice
differentiable.
9
 From the derivation of formula (18) it becomes obvious that Lemma 1 depends crucially on the
assumption that each investor i has a constant cautiousness R( (A.4.a).
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Moreover, Proposition lb), (5) and (18) imply
(19) R'm(w) = ^ jhUW - *m("0^=! V
T2m(w) T2m(w)
and the strict monotonicity of Rm (w) follows from
(Rj-Rm(w)) Rjtj(fj(w))
7 = 1
(Rj-Rm(w))RjTj(fj(w))>
7 = 1
Lemma 1 leads to the main result of this section.
Theorem 3: Under A.I., A.4. a price equilibrium {<f>, (f\{W), . . . , / „
where </> and / , , . . . , / „ are differentiable has the properties:
a) The only investment strategies chosen by investors / = 1,.. . ,« are
- portfolio insurance,
- tactical asset allocation,
- collar strategy.
b) Investors /e{l, . . . ,«} with /?, = max Rj choose portfolio insurance10.
7 = 1 , ••. , n
c) Investors ie{\, ...,n) with /?,•= min Rj choose tactical asset allocation10.
Proof: Formula (5) implies
(20) min R} < Rm (w) < max Rj Vw e [m, M].
j — 1, . . . , n j — 1, . . . , n
Now, a), b) and c) follow immediately from Theorem 2a) and Lemma 1.
Some additional information about price equilibria in the HARA case is
provided by the next result.
10
 See also MCLLER (1990).
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Proposition 2: Under the assumption of Theorem 3 one obtains
a) fi'(w) = , where a = }_, an
" . ;-'
a +
b ) ^ l n ' / / W
dw \f/(w) Tm(u;)
Proof: Special case of Proposition lb) and Theorem 2c).
Comments:
1) In particular Proposition 2b) implies
(21) (
dw \fj (w)
2) For sufficiently large values of w one can show _/) (w) > 0 for / = 1,...,«
and Proposition 2 leads to the following inequalities:
a ) / , (») > with a = 2_, fly. ^max = m ax /?7,
a + wR ;=!«
Finally, an example illustrates some typical properties of a price equilibrium
in the HARA case.
Example:
— The random variable W representing total financial wealth is uniformly
distributed over [0.3, 20].
— There are n = 3 investors with risk tolerance functions
T3 (X) = X
and an initial risk allocation
(J?!, X2, X3) = (0.16 • W, 0.35 • W, 0.49 • W).
The price equilibrium {</>, {f\{W),f2(W),f?,{W))} is illustrated in Figure 3.
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5 "" 0 10
FIGURE 3.
15 20
5. CONCLUSIONS
In this article the theory of risk exchange was applied to the allocation of
financial risk. Special emphasis was put on the shape of the payoff functions in
price equilibrium. Under general conditions the role of risk tolerance and
cautiousness was analysed. The notion of a representative investor was very
useful for the interpretation of the results. Finally, in the HARA case a full
characterization of all equilibrium payoff functions was possible.
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